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Abstract
With this paper, I propose a simple asset pricing model that accounts for
the inﬂuence from social interaction. Investors are assumed to make up their
mind about an asset’s price based on a forecasting strategy and its past
proﬁtability as well as on the contemporaneous expectations of other market
participants. Empirically analysing stocks of the DAX30 index, I provide
evidence that social interaction rather destabilises ﬁnancial markets. Based
on my results, I state that at least, it does not have a stabilising eﬀect.
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In 2008, the DAX30 index fell by more than 40%. The market capitalisa-
tion of the underlying companies declined by 380 bln e. In the subsequent
year, however, the DAX30 index caught up roughly 25% although the econ-
omy still was in a sever crisis. Stock price ﬂuctuations with exaggerations
like these make it hard to believe that market prices only reﬂect fundamental
valuations as postulated by the eﬃcient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970).
Therefore, the literature of behavioural ﬁnance proposed a variety of asset
pricing models considering bounded rationally acting investors.1 All these
models have in common that they deviate from the rather unrealistic state-
ment that all investors have homogeneous beliefs about the asset price. The
assumption of heterogeneous beliefs allows describing those asset price vari-
ations that are not related to an underlying process of fundamental informa-
tion.
The interaction among investors with heterogeneous beliefs generally trans-
mits via the market pricing mechanism. However, it is also reasonable to
consider a direct inﬂuence through observation or communication. There is
already large empirical evidence that conﬁrms the existence and inﬂuence of
such social interaction in ﬁnancial markets. A general herding tendency of
institutional investors has ﬁrst been found by Lakonishok et al. (1992). Their
seminal empirical herding measure has thereafter been applied in many stud-
ies providing similar evidence.2 Regarding the communication among insti-
tutional investors, positive evidence of inﬂuential eﬀects has been provided
by Shiller and Pound (1989); Arnswald (2001); Hong et al. (2005); Pareek
(2011). In the domain of individual investors, analogous behaviour has been
revealed by Hong et al. (2004); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007); Massa and
Simonov (2005a,b).
With this paper, I intend to answer the question whether social interaction
among investors causes large deviations from the fundamental benchmark
1Examples include Beja and Goldman (1980); Kyle (1985); Day and Huang (1990);
Long et al. (1990); Chiarella (1992); F¨ ollmer and Schweizer (1993); Lux (1995); Brock
and Hommes (1998); Kurz (1998); Iori (2002); Chiarella et al. (2003); de Grauwe and
Grimaldi (2004); Horst (2005); F¨ ollmer et al. (2005); Dieci et al. (2006); Cipriani and
Guarino (2008); Huang et al. (2010). Extensive surveys are provided by Hommes (2006);
LeBaron (2006).
2See Frey et al. (2006) for a brief survey of studies that used the measure of Lakonishok
et al. (1992).
2and thereby destabilises ﬁnancial markets. There are situations where social
interaction does not have any eﬀect, irrespective of its intensity. If for in-
stance, investors a priori all have homogeneous beliefs about an asset’s price,
then social inﬂuence would not aﬀect their behaviour at all. Moreover, even
if beliefs are heterogeneous, social interaction can still be without eﬀect, if
the inﬂuence is symmetric. This can be explained as follows. Symmetric
social inﬂuence refers to the situation where every investor inﬂuences ev-
ery other investor with equal intensity. It thereby makes investors’ beliefs
more homogeneous and reduces the variance of opinions. However, it does
not change the average opinion. In a suﬃciently liquid market, where the
asset price more or less reﬂects the average opinion about an asset’s value,
social inﬂuence thus has no eﬀect. Given these facts, I propose an asset
pricing model where investors have heterogeneous beliefs and the inﬂuence
from social interaction among these investors is allowed to be asymmetric.
Particularly, I make use of the well-known adaptive beliefs model of Brock
and Hommes (1997, 1998) and enrich it by the inclusion of social inﬂuence.
In order to empirically analyse the impact of social interaction, I presume the
existence of two investor types, fundamentalists and chartists, who a priori
either have a stabilising or a destabilising eﬀect on ﬁnancial markets.3 I then
contrast the original model of Brock and Hommes (1998) with my extended
version that accounts for asymmetric social inﬂuence. If the null hypothe-
sis of symmetric social inﬂuence can be rejected, then it can be concluded
that social interaction has an impact. The sign of the estimated diﬀerence
between social inﬂuence on fundamentalists and chartists indicates whether
this impact rather is stabilising or destabilising.
With this paper, I contribute to the literature that empirically analyses price
impacts of social interaction, particularly herding behaviour among investors.
On the basis of quarterly stock holdings, Lakonishok et al. (1992); Jones
et al. (1999); Wermers (1999); Sias (2004) provide empirical evidence that
the herding behaviour of institutional investors is information driven and
thus rather stabilises the market. This is in line with the results of Nofsinger
and Sias (1999), who raise the same conclusion on the basis of institutional
3Note that e.g. Huang et al. (2010) proposes a framework where chartists might have
both a destabilising as well as a stabilising eﬀect. The deﬁnitions of fundamentalists and
chartists in this paper, however, are chosen in a way such that fundamentalists always
drive stock prices towards the fundamental benchmark, whereas chartists always drive the
stock price away from it.
3investors’ annually stock holdings. On a semi-annually basis, Walter and We-
ber (2006) show that for the German market institutional herding at least
does not have a destabilising eﬀect. However, diﬀerentiating between herding
on buy and sell decisions, San (2007) on a quarterly basis ﬁnds a destabilis-
ing tendency for institutional sell herding. Analysing shorter time intervals,
Puckett and Yan (2008) similarly show that institutional herding on stock
sales, which are inferred on weekly portfolio changes, indeed may destabilise
markets and thereby cause short-term ﬂuctuations. Considering intra-day
trades, Hsieh (2012) concludes for the Taiwan stock market that herding be-
haviour of institutional investors rather stabilises while the same behaviour
of individual investors rather destabilises the market. All afore cited papers
have in common that the eﬀect on stock prices are inferred from subsequent
stock returns. A stock return reversal is interpreted as a destabilising eﬀect.
Contrarily, my approach oﬀers the possibility to directly infer the eﬀect of
social interaction from the estimates of the model parameters. Moreover, I do
not classify investors into institutional and individual investors as I state that
there might be investors of both categories, who either stabilise or destabilise
market prices. Therefore, I follow the literature about heterogeneous agents
on ﬁnancial markets and assume the existence of two representative investor
types: fundamentalists, who believe that stock prices revert to a fundamental
benchmark and chartists, who extrapolate trends that move the stock price
away from its fundamental value.
My paper is further related to the upcoming literature that is engaged in
the empirical investigation of non linear asset pricing models. An early con-
tribution has been provided by Shiller (1984), who by linear regression esti-
mates a stock pricing model with two heterogeneous investor types, namely
smart money investors with rational expectations and ordinary investors.
Vigfusson (1997) uses a Markov regime-switching technique to estimate the
exchange rate model of Frankel and Froot (1988) with two representative
investor types, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Westerhoﬀ and Re-
itz (2003) and ap Gwilym (2008) use non linear estimation techniques to
estimate exchange rate models with the same representative investor types.
Using the method of simulated moments, Franke (2009) estimates the ex-
change rate model of Manzan and Westerhoﬀ (2005) for both stock indices
and exchanges rates. Considering social interaction, Gilli and Winker (2003)
and Alfarano et al. (2005) estimate Kirman’s herding model (Kirman, 1993)
again with afore mentioned two representative investor types. Although,
Alfarano et al. (2005) account for an asymmetric autonomous switching ten-
4dency for an individual investor to change his type, both Gilli and Winker
(2003) and Alfarano et al. (2005) consider symmetric inﬂuence from social
interaction. Franke (2008); Lux (2012) also take the inﬂuence from social in-
teraction into account. Therefore, they estimate the relation between stock
price returns and an underlying opinion index. My paper is most strongly
related to Boswijk et al. (2007) and Amilon (2008), who estimate the model
of Brock and Hommes (1998), however, in its original form, i.e. without the
inclusion of social interaction.
In this paper, I analyse the price evolution of the stocks that were included
in the DAX30 index as of Dec 31st 2010. For 12 out of 30 stocks, the null
hypothesis of the original model can be rejected. This suggests the presence
of asymmetric inﬂuence from social interaction. The parameter estimates
indicate that fundamentalists are more prone to be socially inﬂuenced by
other market participants than chartists. This means fundamentalists skew
their beliefs more strongly to those of the chartist than past performance of
the strategy would suggest. Therefore, I conclude that if social interaction
has an inﬂuence on stock prices, then this inﬂuence represents a destabilising
impact.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In chapter 2, I review
the literature about asset pricing models that consider the inﬂuence from
social interaction. I present my asset pricing model and derive conditions for
the existence of equilibria in chapter 3. In chapter 4, I empirically estimate
the model and contrast it with the original model of Brock and Hommes
(1998). Chapter 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
The literature of behavioural ﬁnance brought out a variety of theoretical
asset pricing models that take the inﬂuence from social interaction into ac-
count. There are two general types of models which have evolved. On the
one hand, authors of so called heterogeneous agent models assume a small
amount of groups that are formed by investors with representative invest-
ment behaviour. On the other hand, the computationally more challenging
agent based models account for every investor’s individual behaviour. While
the latter type oﬀers the possibility to model asset price ﬂuctuation based on
the very micro level, the advantage of the former type is the mathematical
tractability such that in most cases closed form solutions can be derived.
Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006) provide a comprehensive survey of the
5two concepts. Surveys of asset pricing models that take the inﬂuence from
social interaction into account have been provided by Hirshleifer and Teoh
(2008); Lux (2009).
An early example of heterogeneous agent models considering social inﬂuence
is represented by Lux (1995), who proposes a framework that is based on
the ”ant”-model of Kirman (1993). He assumes that there are two types of
investors in the market, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Chartists are
either optimistic and expect price increases or they are pessimistic and ex-
pect the price to decrease. The probability that a chartist changes his belief
from optimistic to pessimistic or vice versa on the one hand depends on an
idiosyncratic component and on the other hand is related to the portion of
chartists in the market that have a particular either optimistic or pessimistic
expectation. By the second factor a direct inﬂuence from social interaction is
introduced. Simulation results of Lux (1995) show that the model is capable
to reproduce stylised facts which can be observed in ﬁnancial markets. In
Lux (1998), the model is extended by a learning mechanism to switch be-
tween the fundamental and chartist strategy. The work of Alfarano et al.
(2008) is closely related to the two afore cited papers. Contrarily, Alfarano
et al. (2008) assume that social inﬂuence does not only depend on the rel-
ative portion of market participant following a particular strategy, but on
the explicit group sizes and therefore also on the absolute number of market
participants.
Providing an alternative model, Chiarella et al. (2003) assume that investors
follow either a fundamentalist strategy or are herding agents. The latter
infer their beliefs from past excess demand in the market and therefore are
aﬀected by a direct social inﬂuence from other market participants.
Horst (2005); Wu (2007); Horst and Rothe (2008) state that investors choose
between a fundamentalist and chartist strategy depending on which strat-
egy they expect that the majority of the whole market will adopt (”mar-
ket mood”). Horst (2005) moreover takes the inﬂuence from the observable
choice of the nearest neighbours into account. Working with fundamentalists
and noise trades, Pakkanen (2009) proposes an asset pricing model where in-
vestors either trade the asset or revise their belief, i.e. change their type.
When an investor trades the asset, the decision whether to buy or sell it de-
pends on his own prior belief and the general market mood, which represents
a compound measure of all individual investors’ beliefs.
Most closely related to this paper, Chang (2007) uses the model of Brock
and Hommes (1998) and introduces the inﬂuence from social interaction into
6the mechanism of investor’s switching between a fundamental and a chartist
strategy. The social inﬂuence is modelled by the framework of Brock and
Durlauf (2001b,a). Diﬀerent to Chang (2007), I account for an asymmetric
social inﬂuence while switching from one strategy to another. Moreover, I as-
sume that social inﬂuence induces an investor to skew his beliefs towards the
beliefs of other investors without completely rejecting the own and adopting
an alternative strategy.
In the domain of agent based models, one of the ﬁrst contributions in the con-
text of social interaction has been provided by Baker and Iyer (1992). They
assume that investors randomly receive exogenous buy or sell signals and
transmit them via a communication network. If an investor by inter-investor
transmission receives an equal number of buy and sell signals, these signals
cancel out each other, such that the particular investor does not trade at all.
Simulation results show that the topology of this network has a considerable
eﬀect on price volatility and trading volume.
Cont and Bouchaud (2000) propose a framework where investors within the
same neighbourhood always make the same trading decisions. All neighbour-
hoods are isolated. The size of these clusters is obtained by a random graph.
Iori (2002) also states that investors are inﬂuenced by the trades of neigh-
bouring investors. However, an individual investor’s choice does not neces-
sarily coincide with those of his neighbours. Instead, an individual decision
is made based on the weighted average decision of neighbouring investors
within a lattice network as well as on an idiosyncratic component.
Proposing an explicit function for the process of investors’ information elabo-
ration, Sch¨ utz et al. (2009) construct a theoretical framework where investors
build up exogenous sell or buy signals based on the diﬀerence between their
own fundamental valuation of the asset and the current market price. An
investor’s decision whether to buy or to sell an asset then depends on the
own signal and the weighted average of neighbouring investors’ demands.
While afore cited authors, only assumed that an individual investor is inﬂu-
enced by other investors’ actions, i.e. trading decisions, Ozsoylev (2006) and
Ozsoylev and Walden (2011) state that social networks permit the transmis-
sion of information such that better connected investors have more precise
information. Social inﬂuence in this case is not based on other investors’
outcomes, but on their original information signals.
In the same vein, Panchenko et al. (2010) state that well connected investors
are better oﬀ. Particularly, like in this paper, they consider the heteroge-
neous agent model of Brock and Hommes (1998). However, in their frame-
7work, investors can only observe the past proﬁtability of a strategy, if there
are investors in the neighbourhood who adopted this strategy in the past.
This means for instance, an investor is unable to get to know the proﬁtability
of the chartist strategy if he is only surrounded by fundamentalists. The dif-
ference to my approach is that I assume that real markets oﬀer a minimum
of transparency that makes it possible to observe the past proﬁtability of all
strategies. Social inﬂuence in my framework thus only aﬀects the elaboration
of the information that is available to every market participant.
Also based on the assumption of information transmission within a social
network, Colla and Mele (2010) propose a framework where trades are pos-
itively correlated if investors are located nearby because of the exchange of
information and trades are negatively correlated if investors are further away
acting as counterparties in the market clearing mechanism.
The approach of Kaizoji (2000) originally stems from the domain of agent
based models. For the sake of an empirical analysis however, the underlying
social network is simpliﬁed such that analytical tractability as in heteroge-
neous agent models is obtained. Investors are supposed to be either willing
to buy or willing to sell the asset. An investor bases his decision on the
general market environment and furthermore is directly inﬂuenced by the
contemporaneous asset demand of other investors in the market.
With my approach, I set up on a heterogeneous agent model that trough the
inclusion of social inﬂuence becomes an agent based model oﬀering the possi-
bility to account for every individual investor’s behaviour. However, in order
to ensure analytical tractability, which is needed for the empirical analysis,
I simplify the structure of the underlying social network and thereby again
obtain a heterogeneous agent model.
3. Asset pricing in the presence of social interaction
In the following, I present the model of Brock and Hommes (1998) and
enrich it by an inﬂuential component based on social interaction among in-
vestors.
3.1. Market price mechanism
Considering a market with one risky and one riskless asset, investors are
confronted to the decision how to allocate their present wealth in order to
maximise next period’s wealth, which is given by
Wi,t+1 = (1 + r)Wi,t + (pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt)zit, (1)
8where pt and pt+1 are this period’s and next period’s market price of the
risky asset that pays an uncertain dividend yt+1. The return of the risk free
asset with perfectly elastic supply is given by r. An investor’s individual
demand for the risky asset equals zit. Investors are assumed to be myopic
mean-variance optimisers, such that zit results from
max
zit
Eit[Wi,t+1] −
ait
2
Varit[Wi,t+1], (2)
where Eit and Varit are an investor’s conditional expectation and variance
at time t and ait stands for an investor’s constant average risk aversion. In
order to keep the model analytically tractable, Brock and Hommes (1998)
introduced the following assumptions:
Varit[Wi,t+1] := σ
2 (3)
ait := a. (4)
This means that the conditional variance about next period’s wealth and the
coeﬃcient of risk aversion are presumed to be constant among investors as
well as in time. The resulting demand of an individual investor is hence given
by
zit =
Eit[pt+1 + yt+1 − (1 + r)pt]
aσ2 . (5)
The model is closed by the following market clearing equation
X
i
zit = Lt, (6)
where Lt is the contemporaneous net supply of the risky asset. Plugging
equation 5 into equation 6 and solving for pt yields
pt =
1
1 + r
(
X
i
Eit[pt+1 + yt+1] − aσ
2Lt). (7)
It is possible to derive the fundamental equilibrium, which is arises when all
investors have homogeneous beliefs, i.e. have the same conditional expecta-
tion about the risky asset:
p
∗
t =
1
1 + r
(Et[p
∗
t+1 + yt+1] − aσ
2Lt). (8)
9The fundamental price is indicated by a star. Subtracting equation 8 from
equation 7 oﬀers the possibility to express the price equation as deviations
from the fundamental price:
xt =
1
1 + r
X
i
Eit[xt+1], (9)
with xt = pt − p∗
t. Please note that equation 9 contains the implicit as-
sumption that dividends follow a stochastic process with constant temporal
mean. For notational convenience, an investor’s beliefs about next period’s
deviation from the fundamental value are henceforth denoted by fit, i.e.
fit = Eit[xt+1]. (10)
3.2. Heterogeneous beliefs and social interaction
An investor is assumed to make up his beliefs about future deviations of
the market price from the fundamental benchmark based on two sources. On
the one hand, he considers his own a priori expectation. On the other hand
and additionally to the original model of Brock and Hommes (1998), I assume
that he also takes into account the beliefs of other market participants. In
order to consider the inﬂuence from this social interaction, I make use of the
linear model from the social interaction literature (e.g. Manski (1993); Mof-
ﬁtt (2001); Bramoull´ e et al. (2009); Blume et al. (2010); Lee et al. (2010)):4
fit = θit + δi
 
X
j6=i
γijfjt − θit
!
, (11)
where θit represents the expectation of the future deviation from the funda-
mental benchmark that an investor makes up on his own. The coeﬃcient δi
measures the magnitude of social inﬂuence. Every other investor’s inﬂuence
is weighted with γij ≥ 0. Ensuring that δi captures the total magnitude of
inﬂuence, the following constraint shall be imposed:
X
j6=i
γij
! = 1. (12)
4Contrary to the social interaction literature, I do not consider contextual eﬀects, i.e.
the inﬂuence of an individual’s characteristics on the outcome of an other individual, as it
is unlikely that an investor’s beliefs are inﬂuenced by the background of another investors.
10In order to avoid a general upward bias of an investor’s beliefs fit through
the inclusion of inﬂuence from social interaction, only the diﬀerence between
the weighted average of other investor’s beliefs and an investor’s own a priori
expectation is considered in equation 11.5
The values of the coeﬃcient of social interaction δi can be interpreted as
follows. If 0 < δi < 1, then an investor skews his initial expectation towards
the expectation of other investors. The resulting expectation then represents
a weighted average of the own initial and other investors’ beliefs. This situ-
ation shall be henceforth referred as moderate social inﬂuence. For δi = 0,
an investor is not inﬂuenced by other investors at all, whereas for δi = 1,
an investor completely rejects his own a priori expectation and adapts the
weighted beliefs of other investors. It is also possible that an investor is such
strongly inﬂuenced that he skews his own expectation even beyond those of
other investors. In this case, henceforth denoted extreme social inﬂuence,
δi can take values greater than one. Values below zero are not considered
for δi as this would represent a negative inﬂuence from social interaction.
Indeed, arbitrageurs might act as contrarians and therefore have opposite
beliefs. This however represents a form of inﬂuence which translates through
the market price mechanism and hence cannot be understood as a direct
inﬂuence from social interaction.
The integration of social inﬂuence into the original model of Brock and
Hommes (1998) could lead to infeasible solutions for the asset price depending
on the values of δi. The following propositions state, under which conditions
the existence of exactly one equilibrium price is ensured.
Proposition 1: If all investors are only moderately inﬂuenced by other
investors (δi < 1), then exactly one feasible market equilibrium arises from
equation 9.
The proof is given in the appendix A.2. Proposition 1 shows that for
an arbitrary structure of the underlying social network, there exists always
an equilibrium, if social inﬂuence is moderate. Having a closer look at the
particular network structure where every investor equally weights other in-
5In the social interaction literature, this diﬀerence is generally not considered, such
that stronger social inﬂuence leads to higher outcomes (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001;
Glaeser et al., 2003). Such a social multiplier is however not reasonable in this context,
as social inﬂuence can be assumed to drive asset prices into both directions.
11vestors’ beliefs, proposition 2 and 3 state under which conditions the presence
of extreme social inﬂuence still leads to feasible model solutions. The struc-
ture of equal weights is very convenient as it ensures analytical tractability,
which is needed for the empirical analysis later in this paper.
Proposition 2: Suppose that there are N investors who all equally weight
other investors’ beliefs (γij = 1
N−1) and that at least two investors are only
moderately inﬂuenced by other investors (δi < 1). If for all investors that are
extremely inﬂuenced (δi > 1), the magnitude of inﬂuence does not reach or
exceed an upper bound given by δi < N−1 P
j6=i min{δj,1}, then exactly one feasible
market equilibrium arises from equation 9.
Appendix A.3 provides the proof of this proposition. In order to restrict
the number of degrees of freedom in the empirical analysis, only two repre-
sentative investor types and a large number of investors are considered. The
following proposition derives the equilibrium condition for this constellation
still assuming a network structure with equal weights.
Proposition 3: Assume that there are two representative investor types in
a market with a large number of investors (N → ∞). Each type shall be
inﬂuenced by all other investors with a particular type-speciﬁc magnitude (δ1
and δ2). Suppose further that all investors equally weight other investors’ be-
liefs (γij = 1
N−1). Equation 9 yields exactly one feasible market equilibrium,
if the following inequality is fulﬁlled: nδ1 + (1 − n)δ2 6= 1, where n is the
portion of investors of a particular type.
See appendix A.4 for the proof of proposition 3.
3.3. Fundamentalists vs. chartists and adaptive beliefs
Brock and Hommes (1998) assume that an investor infers his a priori
expectation from past observations, i.e.
θit = Φi +
X
k
Φikxt−k. (13)
Φi represents an investor’s constant bias compared to the fundamental bench-
mark. The coeﬃcients Φik are individual weights of past observations and
deﬁne whether an investors rather has a stabilising or a destabilising eﬀect
12on the market price. If Φik < 1, then investor i expects that the deviation
of the asset price from its fundamental value will decrease during the next
period. Therefore, he is willing to buy (sell) the asset, if its market price is
below (above) the fundamental benchmark and thereby stabilises the market.
Contrarily, investor i believes that the market price further divagates from
the fundamental equilibrium, if Φik > 1. He thereby destabilises the market.
In order to keep the model analytically tractable and to make an empirical
analysis possible, I hereafter assume that there are only two types of investors
in the market, namely fundamentalists and chartists. Mathematically, the
fundamental strategy shall be deﬁned by
Φi = 0 (14)
Φik =

ΦF < 0 if k = 1
0 if k 6= 1 (15)
δi = δF (16)
γij =
1
N − 1
, (17)
with N being the total Number of investors in the market. Analogously the
chartist strategy shall be given by
Φi = 0 (18)
Φik =

ΦC > 0 if k = 1
0 if k 6= 1 (19)
δi = δC (20)
γij =
1
N − 1
. (21)
With these deﬁnitions and assuming a large number of investors (N → ∞),
investors’ beliefs turn out to be
fFt = (1 − δF)ΦFxt−1 + δF (nFtfFt + nCtfCt) (22)
and
fCt = (1 − δC)ΦCxt−1 + δC (nFtfFt + nCtfCt), (23)
where nFt and nCt are the portions of investors in the market who either
follow the fundamental or the chartist strategy. As only two investor types
13are assumed, the portion of chartists can be expressed by nCt = 1 − nFt.
Equations 24 and 25 can be written as
fFt =
(1 − δF)(1 − δC(1 − nFt))ΦFxt−1 + δF(1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
(24)
and
fCt =
(1 − δC)(1 − δFnFt)ΦCxt−1 + δC(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
. (25)
Plugging equations 24 and 25 into equation 9 yields
xt =
1
1 + r

nFt
(1 − δF)(1 − δC(1 − nFt))ΦFxt−1 + δF(1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
+(1 − nFt)
(1 − δC)(1 − δFnFt)ΦCxt−1 + δC(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)

=
1
1 + r
(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
. (26)
Investors are assumed to choose a strategy based on its past proﬁtability
(”adaptive beliefs”). In this context, however, they do not consider eﬀects
of social interaction in the past. Hence, I presume that they do not take
into account that they would have been inﬂuenced by other investors while
choosing a particular strategy. The last period’s proﬁtability of a strategy
πt−1 is obtained by the multiplication of the return Rt−1 which would have
been realised in the last period t − 1, with the corresponding hypothetical
quantity zt−2 being bought or sold at t − 2, if this particular strategy had
been chosen at t − 2, i.e.
πt−1 = Rt−1zt−2. (27)
The proﬁtability of the fundamental strategy is given by
πF,t−1 = (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
EF,t−2[xt−1] − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2 (28)
πF,t−1 = (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
ΦFxt−3 − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2 . (29)
Analogously the proﬁtability of the chartist strategy turns out to be
πC,t−1 = (xt−1 − (1 + r)xt−2)
ΦCxt−3 − (1 + r)xt−2
aσ2 . (30)
14An investor’s utility as a function of the realised proﬁtability shall be given
by
Uit = πt−1 + it, (31)
where it is an individual investor’s identically independently distributed er-
ror when perceiving the proﬁtability of a particular strategy. This noise term
is assumed to be drawn from a double exponential distribution. As the num-
ber of investors goes to inﬁnity, the portion of investors in the market that
follow the fundamental strategy turns out to be
nFt =
eβπF,t−1
eβπF,t−1 + eβπC,t−1 (32)
=
1
1 + e−β(πF,t−1−πC,t−1), (33)
where β is the intensity of choice measuring investors’ tendency to choose
the strategy which has better performed in the past. For β = 0, investors do
not take into account past proﬁtability at all. As β goes towards inﬁnity, in-
vestors always choose the strategy with the highest past proﬁtability. Please
note that the switching mechanism is symmetric. Hence, the probability for
choosing a particular strategy only depends on the strategy’s past proﬁtabil-
ity and not on the strategy itself.
Plugging equations 29 and 30 into equation 33 yields
nFt =
1
1 + e
−β((xt−1−(1+r)xt−2)
(ΦF −ΦC)xt−3−(1+r)xt−2
aσ2 )
. (34)
4. Empirical analysis
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate, whether the inﬂu-
ence of social interaction has a stabilising or a destabilising eﬀect on ﬁnancial
markets. The estimation equations of the non linear adaptive beliefs model
presented in the previous chapter are given by
xt =
1
1 + r
(1 − δF)nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − δC)(1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1
1 − δFnFt − δC(1 − nFt)
+ t (35)
nFt =
1
1 + e−β∗(xt−1−(1+r)xt−2)(ΦF−ΦC)xt−3−(1+r)xt−2, (36)with β∗ =
β
aσ2. Reformulating equation 35 yields
xt =
1
1 + r
nFtΦFxt−1 + (1 − nFt)ΦCxt−1 − ∆δ
1−δCnFtΦFxt−1
1 − ∆δ
1−δCnFt
+ t, (37)
with ∆δ = δF −δC. Thereof, it follows that the absolute values of the coeﬃ-
cients of social interaction δF and δC are not directly identiﬁable. However,
this doesn’t matter, because only the diﬀerence between δF and δC is of in-
terest, as only asymmetric social inﬂuence, i.e. ∆δ 6= 0 irrespective of the
absolute values of δF and δC, can have an impact on asset prices. Indeed,
for ∆δ = 0 equation 37 reduces to the original model of Brock and Hommes
(1998).
If the estimate of ∆δ∗ = ∆δ
1−δC turns out to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, it can be concluded that social interaction has an impact on the asset
price. Stated diﬀerently, if ∆δ∗ 6= 0, the model ﬁt is better, if social inﬂuence
is taken into account, because there are deviations from the fundamental
benchmark which are caused by the inﬂuence of social interaction.
Regarding the implications of diﬀerent values for ∆δ∗, ﬁgure 1 shows that
for ∆δ∗ > 1 either δF > 1 and δC < 1 or δF < 1 and δC > 1. Hence, if ∆δ∗
is greater than one, then either fundamentalists or chartsists are extremely
inﬂuenced by social interaction. If ∆δ∗ < 1, then it follows that δF < 1 and
δC < 1, because the case where δF > 1 and δC > 1 shall be excluded, as it
would imply that all investors are extremely inﬂuenced by social interaction.
This doesn’t make sense, because in such a situation fundamentalists would
just become chartists and vice versa. Hence, if ∆δ∗ is smaller than one, all
investors are only moderately inﬂuenced by social interaction.
In order to disentangle, whether social interaction has a stabilising or desta-
bilising eﬀect on ﬁnancial markets, one has to look at the sign of the estimated
coeﬃcient ∆δ∗. Figure 1 conﬁrms that as long as ∆δ∗ is smaller than one,
the sign of ∆δ corresponds to the sign of ∆δ∗. If ∆δ turns out to be positive,
then investors following the fundamental strategy skew their opinion more
strongly towards the opinion of investors following the chartist strategy and
vice versa, if ∆δ is negative. Hence, ∆δ > 0 indicates that social interaction
has a destabilising eﬀect, while ∆δ < 0 suggests that social interaction rather
stabilises the market.
I estimate the model by non linear least squares regression for all stocks that
were included in the DAX30 as of Dec 31st 2010. For the preceding seven
years time period, i.e. from Jan 1st 2004 to Dec 31st 2010, I retrieved daily
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Figure 1: Relationship between δF and δC
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The ﬁgure displays the relationship between δF and δC for diﬀerent values of ∆δ∗ = ∆δ
1−δC .
closing prices from Thomson Reuters. The choice of the time window is very
convenient, as it captures the economic upturn until 2006 as well as the ﬁ-
nancial and economic crisis starting in 2007. In order to have a fundamental
benchmark, I furthermore collected analysts’ consensus price targets from
the I/B/E/S database also provided by Thomson Reuters. The diﬀerence
between the stock price and analysts’ opinions about a stock’s fair value
represents the deviation from the fundamental benchmark, denoted by xt in
the model. For several reasons, analysts’ predictions are biased.6 In order
to account for this fact, I demeaned the stocks’ time series of deviations.
Moreover, I considered weekly averages in order to suppress very short-term
ﬂuctuations. The weekly risk-free rate r is obtained from the yield curve of
German government bonds as published on the homepage of the Deutsche
Bundesbank.7
The results for all 30 stocks are given in table 1. It can be seen that without
imposing any restriction on ΦF and ΦC, the estimate of ΦF is smaller than
one and the estimate of ΦC is greater than one for all 30 stocks, such that
the deﬁnitions of fundamentalists and chartists are met. Also remarkably, all
estimates of ∆δ∗ are smaller than one. This implies that no investor is ex-
tremely inﬂuenced by social interaction. Moreover, the model always yields
a feasible market equilibrium price as stated by the propositions in chapter
3.2. For 16 out of 30 stocks, the estimate of ∆δ∗ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
6See for instance Graham (1999); Hong et al. (2000); Welch (2000); Cooper et al.
(2001); Hong and Kubik (2003); Bernhardt et al. (2006); Chen and Jiang (2006); Clarke
and Subramanian (2006); Naujoks et al. (2009); Jegadeesh and Kim (2010)
7See www.bundesbank.de
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Table 1: Estimation results
∆δ∗ β∗ ΦF ΦC R2
adj
ADIDAS AG 0,6501*** 35,7675*** 0,9246*** 1,0387*** 0,9967
(0,020919) (142,444405) (0,000042) (0,000024)
ALLIANZ SE 0,3044 5,3527** 0,9607*** 1,0383*** 0,9977
(0,099270) (4,945269) (0,000019) (0,000020)
BASF SE 0,5899*** 10,4456*** 0,9094*** 1,0461*** 0,9965
(0,013401) (12,166114) (0,000123) (0,000041)
BAY. MOTOREN WERKE AG (c.s.) 0,2086 4,7428** 0,8892*** 1,0845*** 0,9949
(0,044880) (3,734100) (0,000352) (0,000294)
BAYER AG 0,1175 47,9942** 0,9443*** 1,0411*** 0,9960
(0,136659) (449,717985) (0,000039) (0,000033)
BEIERSDORF AG 0,7784*** 109,9968 0,9367*** 1,0313*** 0,9950
(0,056343) (5.040,095470) (0,000050) (0,000027)
COMMERZBANK AG 0,4967** 0,3305 0,6845*** 1,1596*** 0,9980
(0,043702) (0,243851) (0,045003) (0,017597)
DAIMLER AG -0,2164 43,3092* 0,9636*** 1,0299*** 0,9974
(0,482772) (627,623548) (0,000019) (0,000020)
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 0,2543 1,8519*** 0,9350*** 1,0495*** 0,9979
(0,038774) (0,432202) (0,000086) (0,000075)
DEUTSCHE BOERSE AG 0,7329*** 1,1790*** 0,9240*** 1,0287*** 0,9978
(0,008016) (0,154737) (0,000083) (0,000024)
DEUTSCHE POST AG 0,7952*** 527,5659 0,9425*** 1,0300*** 0,9956
(0,072417) (125.357,996408) (0,000040) (0,000024)
DEUTSCHE TELEKOM AG -0,0862 317,0287*** 0,9618*** 1,0386*** 0,9984
(0,098133) (12.538,620584) (0,000026) (0,000029)
E.ON AG 0,5056*** 32,8602*** 0,9500*** 1,0312*** 0,9978
(0,033217) (136,342429) (0,000039) (0,000023)
FRESEN.MED.CARE KGAA (c.s.) 0,0697 6,0591* 0,8986*** 1,0858*** 0,9888
(0,148020) (10,476852) (0,000752) (0,000529)
FRESENIUS SE (p.s.) 0,1779 11,0349*** 0,9432*** 1,0440*** 0,9975
(0,053081) (14,114374) (0,000048) (0,000048)
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG 0,6028*** 0,5679** 0,8850*** 1,0481*** 0,9970
(0,024636) (0,081493) (0,000430) (0,000276)
HENKEL AG &CO KGAA (p.s.) 0,4634** 42,2867*** 0,9257*** 1,0432*** 0,9958
(0,035872) (253,485100) (0,000069) (0,000042)
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES AG 0,4763*** 41,2219*** 0,9003*** 1,0529*** 0,9969
(0,021067) (198,262469) (0,000162) (0,000120)
K+S AG 0,6789 100,0079 0,9722*** 1,0217*** 0,9978
(0,181356) (9.472,241923) (0,000014) (0,000014)
LINDE AG 0,4901** 13,5113** 0,9409*** 1,0349*** 0,9968
(0,041666) (27,600937) (0,000040) (0,000025)
LUFTHANSA AG 0,4188** 58,6607** 0,9354*** 1,0451*** 0,9964
(0,044752) (638,065119) (0,000123) (0,000085)
MAN SE (c.s.) 0,6584*** 7,2738** 0,9535*** 1,0287*** 0,9979
(0,031407) (8,080573) (0,000027) (0,000015)
MERCK KGAA 0,4801*** 1,1107** 0,9076*** 1,0509*** 0,9973
(0,025386) (0,237078) (0,000290) (0,000152)
METRO AG (c.s.) 0,3575 41,5839** 0,9508*** 1,0395*** 0,9969
(0,088946) (316,530440) (0,000028) (0,000023)
MUENCH. RUECKVERS. AG 0,5550*** 3,3960*** 0,9074*** 1,0446*** 0,9943
(0,028974) (1,571806) (0,000108) (0,000067)
RWE AG (c.s.) 0,5002*** 13,4324*** 0,9456*** 1,0374*** 0,9975
(0,032854) (23,153506) (0,000029) (0,000020)
SAP AG -0,5612 185,2925* 0,9535*** 1,0487*** 0,9951
(0,893932) (10.647,624583) (0,000033) (0,000039)
SIEMENS AG 0,3759 5,7225** 0,9463*** 1,0356*** 0,9966
(0,066923) (5,873838) (0,000041) (0,000033)
THYSSENKRUPP AG -2,4694 332,5254 0,9598*** 1,0290*** 0,9970
(20,374941) (89.305,542038) (0,000021) (0,000017)
VOLKSWAGEN AG (p.s.) 0,1959 17,4221 0,9854*** 1,0155*** 0,9988
(0,513363) (221,431663) (0,000009) (0,000009)
The table provides the estimated coeﬃcients of the non linear least squares regression
for the stocks that were included in the DAX30 as of Dec 31st 2010. Common stocks
are marked with ”c.p.”, preferred stocks are indicated by ”p.s.”. The diﬀerence between
the magnitude of social inﬂuence of fundamentalists δF and chartists δC results from
∆δ∗ = δF−δC
1−δC . The intensity of choice, measuring investors’ tendency to choose the
strategy which has better performed in the past, divided by investors’ constant rate of
risk aversion and the expected price volatility is given by β∗ =
β
aσ2. The coeﬃcients ΦF
and ΦC are the factors that fundamentalists and chartists use to form their expectations
based on the past deviation of the asset price from its fundamental benchmark. The
signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients is indicated by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
The corresponding standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.from zero. Hence, for more than half of the stocks, the inﬂuence from social
interaction explains a part of the stock price ﬂuctuations around its funda-
mental benchmark. Interestingly, in all of these cases, the estimates of ∆δ∗
are greater than zero, which indicates that δF is greater than δC. Hence, fun-
damentalists skew their beliefs more strongly into the direction of chartists
than chartists do into the opposite direction. Therefore, it can be concluded
that social interaction rather has a destabilising impact on ﬁnancial markets.
Overall, one can state that social inﬂuence at least does not have a stabilising
eﬀect.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I introduced an asset pricing model that takes the inﬂuence
from social interaction into account. The framework is based on the adap-
tive beliefs system of Brock and Hommes (1998). Empirically analysing all
stocks in the DAX30 index as of Dec 31st 2010, I found that social inﬂuence
explains a part of the ﬂuctuations of the stock price around its fundamental
benchmark for more than half of the stocks. Moreover, my results suggest
that social interaction rather has a destabilising impact on stock prices. At
least, one can state that it does not have a stabilising eﬀect.
Appendix
A.1. Equilibrium condition
All propositions in chapter 3.2 refer to conditions that if fulﬁlled lead
to exactly one equilibrium market price given by equation 9. Such an equi-
librium is obtained, if equation 11 has exactly one feasible solution for the
vector of investors’ beliefs ft = (f1t,f2t,...,fit,...,fNt)T. For notational
convenience, equation 11 can be written in the vectorial form:
ft = θt + D(Γft − θt), (38)
where θt = (θ1t,θ2t,...,θit,...,θNt)Tand the matrices D and Γ are given by
D =

  
   

δ1 0 ... 0 ... 0
0 δ2 ... 0 ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
0 0 ... δi ... 0
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
0 0 ... 0 ... δN

  
   

(39)
19and
Γ =

  
   

0 γ12 ... γ1j ... γ1N
γ21 0 ... γ2j ... γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
γi1 γi2 ... 0 ... γiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
γN1 γN2 ... γNj ... 0

  
   

. (40)
Solving equation 38 for ft ones obtains
ft = M
−1(I − D)θt, (41)
where I is the identity matrix and M is given by
M = I − DΓ =

  
   

1 −δ1γ12 ... −δ1γ1j ... −δ1γ1N
−δ2γ21 1 ... −δ2γ2j ... −δ2γ2N
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−δiγi1 −δiγi2 ... 1 ... −δiγiN
. . .
. . . ... . . . ... . . .
−δNγN1 −δNγN2 ... −δNγNj ... 1

  
   

. (42)
Equation 41 yields exactly one solution for ft, if the following condition is
met:
Det(M) 6= 0. (43)
Hence, if the determinant of M is unequal to zero, equation 9 leads to exactly
one equilibrium market price.
A.2. Proof of proposition 1
In order to give the proof of proposition 1, it has to be shown that the
determinant of M is always unequal to zero, if all δi are smaller than one. If
δi < 1, then M has a dominant diagonal, because constraint 12 ensures that
for each row
1 >
X
j6=i
|−δiγij| (44)
is fulﬁlled. Therefore, the determinant of M is unequal to zero (Taussky,
1949). 
20A.3. Proof of proposition 2
If one allows δi to be greater than one for some investors, then the matrix
M no longer has a dominant diagonal as stated in the proof of proposition 1.
If however additionally a network structure with equal weights (γij = 1
N−1) is
presumed, then M can be reformulated, such that still a dominant diagonal
is obtained. Multiplying the rows of a matrix with a factor unequal to zero
only scales the determinant by this factor, but never induces the determinant
to become equal or unequal to zero. Therefore, the rows of the matrix M
where δi > 1 are multiplied by 1
δi. In order to demonstrate this, assume a
market with four investors where δ1 > 1, δ2 < 1, δ3 > 1 and δ4 < 1. After
multiplication, the matrix M is given by
M =




1
δ1 − 1
N−1 − 1
N−1 − 1
N−1
−δ2
1
N−1 1 −δ2
1
N−1 −δ2
1
N−1
− 1
N−1 − 1
N−1
1
δ3 − 1
N−1
−δ4
1
N−1 −δ4
1
N−1 −δ4
1
N−1 1



. (45)
Looking at the rows where δi > 1, it can be seen that the conditions for a
dominant diagonal are not fulﬁlled, because
1
δi
<
X
j6=i
   −
1
N − 1
    = 1 for δi > 1. (46)
However, regarding the columns of the resulting matrix, there are two kinds
of conditions that if fulﬁlled ensure a dominant diagonal. For those investors
where δi < 1 the diagonal element still is one as those rows remained un-
changed by the multiplication. The conditions for the columns where the
diagonal element is one is given by
1 >
X
j6=i
 
 −min{δj,1}
1
N − 1
 
 . (47)
This is always fulﬁlled, if there are at least two investors who are only mod-
erately inﬂuenced (δi < 1). The condition for investors where δi > 1 is given
by
1
δi
>
X
j6=i
  
−min{δj,1}
1
N − 1
  

δi <
1
P
j6=i
 −min{δj,1} 1
N−1
  (48)
21If this is met for all investors with δi > 1, then a dominant diagonal is ensured
and hence the determinant of M is unequal to zero. 
A.4. Proof of proposition 3
If there are only two investor types with speciﬁc values for the magnitude
of social inﬂuence (δ1 and δ2) and the network structure still consists of equal
weights (γij = 1
N−1), then the equilibrium conditions of proposition 2 can be
stated more precisely. Particularly, the matrix M is then given by
M =

   
  

1 ... −δ1γ1j −δ1γ1(j+1) ... −δ1γ1N
. . . ... . . .
. . . ... . . .
−δ1γK1 ... 1 −δ1γK(j+1) ... −δ1γKN
−δ2γ(K+1)1 ... −δ2γ(K+1)j 1 ... −δ2γ(K+1)N
. . . ... . . .
. . . ... . . .
−δ2γN1 ... −δ2γNj −δ2γN(j+1) ... 1

   
  

,
(49)
where K is number of ﬁrst type investors. The determinant of M turns out
to be
Det(M) = (−1)
(N−1)

δ1
N − 1
+ 1
(K−1) 
δ2
N − 1
+ 1
(N−K−1)

−1 +
Kδ1
N − 1
+
(N − K)δ2
N − 1
−
δ1 + δ2 − δ1δ2
N − 1

. (50)
As δi ≥ 0, the determinant of M is always unequal to zero, if the last term
of equation 50 is unequal to zero. Hence,
Kδ1
N − 1
+
(N − K)δ2
N − 1
−
δ1 + δ2 − δ1δ2
N − 1
6= 1. (51)
As N tends towards inﬁnity, equation 51 becomes
nδ1 + (n − 1)δ2 6= 1, (52)
with n = K
N. 
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